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THE SHIFTING SANDS OF PRICE EROSION:
PRICE EROSION DAMAGES SHIFT BY TENS OF
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS DEPENDING UPON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRE-NOTICE ERODED
PRICES
Bohrer,t Lynde tt & Morristtt
Abstract
Competition from an infringing product reduces the price the
patent holder can charge for its product. An economist pegs the
beginning of the reduced prices to the date the infringing conduct
begins. In other words, there is economic harm to the patent holder in
the form offalling prices on or soon after the infringing sales begin.
However, the accounting period for patent infringement damages
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often begins much later-the commencement of the damage accounting
period is usually tied to the date the patent holder gives actual or
constructive notice under the patent marking statute. This article
addresses whether the calculation of damages on the infringing sales
that fall within the accounting period should: a) reflect the fact that,
as of the commencement of the accounting period, prices have
already eroded to a specific level, or b) employ the fiction that, as of
the commencement of the accounting period, there has been no
previous erosion in prices. There is sparse and conflicting law
regarding whether or not the court should allow damage experts to
consider and rely upon evidence of pre-notice eroded prices in
calculating price erosion damages. As price erosion is often a major
portion of the total damages awarded for patent infringement, this
unsettled area of law is ripe for clarification.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are unresolved questions regarding the calculation of price
erosion damages.' How these questions are answered significantly
changes, by as much as tens of millions of dollars or more, the
amount of price erosion damages that a patent owner may recover for
infringement.2
What gives rise to the question is that infringing sales often
begin months, if not years, before the date that damages may first be
recovered on the infringing sales. In other words, infringing sales
often precede actual or constructive notice of infringement, which is
the common commencement date of the accounting period for
calculating patent infringement damages.3 With respect to price
erosion, price reductions caused by infringement can be traced back
1. See, e.g., Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.98-74495, 2002 WL
31008328, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2002), aftd, No. 02-1623, 2003 WL 21479539, at **I
(Fed. Cir. June 20, 2003) (affirming the district court's award of price erosion damages using
pre-damage period data). But see Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc.,
No. C.A. 04-1371-JJF, 2006 WL 2435084, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2006) (denying a motion to
calculate price erosion damages using pre-notice data.).
2. See infra Section II.
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) ("In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall
be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer
was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages
may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for
infringement shall constitute such notice.").
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to the date the infringing sales began.4 As shown in Figure 1, below,
this is the diagonal line of declining prices over time. The entire area
from the beginning of infringing sales onward is the economic loss
suffered by the patent holder.
Price
Price
'But For'
Infringing
Competition
Infringing
Sales Begin
Fig. 1. Economic Loss Due to Price Erosion
As shown in Figure 2, below, rolling the clock forward from the
date infringing sales begin to the commencement of the damages
accounting period finds prices already significantly reduced below the
levels they would have been at "but for" the infringing competition. It
is well settled law that the economic loss due to infringing sales
which occurred prior to the time of notice is excluded from recovery.5
This "legally unrecoverable" economic loss to the patent holder is
shown in the upper triangular section to the left of the notice line. It is
also well settled law that price erosion damages for all infringing
sales made after notice are recoverable.6 This "legally recoverable"
4. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 294-95 (7th
ed. 2009) (showing that when the infringing sales compete, then they cause lost profits from lost
sales and/or price erosion).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
6. See id
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economic loss is shown in the lower triangular section to the right of
the notice line.
'But For
Price Pre-Notice
Economlc Loss
of Recoverable
. S
.3 . . .
Infringing
Sales Begin
Notice Time
Fig. 2. Effect of Notice on Recovery of Damages
As shown in Figure 2, above, rolling the clock forward from the
date infringing sales begin to the commencement of the damages
accounting period finds prices already significantly reduced below the
levels they would have been at "but for" the infringing competition. It
is well settled law that the economic loss due to infringing sales
which occurred prior to the time of notice is excluded from recovery.
7
This "legally unrecoverable" economic loss to the patent holder is
shown in the upper triangular section to the left of the notice line. It is
also well settled law that price erosion damages for all infringing
8
sales made after notice are recoverable. This "legally recoverable"
economic loss is shown in the lower triangular section to the right of
the notice line.
But what about the economic loss for "post-notice" sales that
result from "pre-notice" price erosion? This specific loss is described
in the shaded area in Figure 3, below, as the large rectangular portion
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
8. See id.
i I I=
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to the right of the notice line. This paper focuses on this unsettled area
of law, i.e., it delves into arguments for and against whether this
rectangular area should be included in price erosion calculations.
Price
"But For
Price
* -, ic, E
-,eola A, riS
T he area
of concern
In this paper
Infringing Notice lime
Sales Begin
Fig. 3. Unresolved Price Erosion
As demonstrated in Figure 3, the amount of post-notice damages
from pre-notice price erosion can be quite significant. It is one thing if
the court's rules regarding the methods for calculating damages allow
consideration of the depressed prices that pre-date the accounting
period. It is quite another thing if the earlier decline in prices is
excluded from consideration, i.e., where the court applies the fiction
that the commencement of the accounting period marks the earliest
date for which there has been any reduction in prices due to infringing
competition. There is a tremendous difference in the amount of price
erosion damages, depending upon which of these two alternate
approaches is applied by the court.
The figures above oversimplify price erosion over time. In fact,
there is no reason to presume that the prices would fall in a
completely linear fashion. Instead, it is not uncommon to observe a
relatively sharp decline at the commencement of infringing sales that
will slowly taper off in a parabolic fashion as the product price
approaches production cost. Figure 4, below, illustrates this situation.
I
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In this more realistic model of price erosion, the inclusion or
exclusion of pre-notice price erosion data for post-notice sales
becomes an even greater portion of the total potential damage
recovery.
Price
PnricngPnre tce Tm
'But For'
EconOm c LossNot Re~vwrale
Infringing Notice i ceSales Begin
Fig. 4. Real World Price Decline
This article seeks to shed greater light on the issue by describing
the unsettled state of the current case law, and presenting the legal
and economic arguments for and against allowing consideration of
pre-accounting period data on declining prices.
II. BACKGROUND ON PRICE EROSION DAMAGES AND THE
ACCOUNTING PERIOD: A TYPICAL SITUATION
We use a hypothetical to understand patent infringement
damages generally, and lost profit damages due to price erosion
specifically. The hypothetical also sheds further light on the
relationship between the commencement of the damages accounting
period, on the one hand, and the earlier time period encompassing the
accrual of economic loss resulting from infringement-depressed
prices, on the other hand.
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In our hypothetical, an overseas manufacturer (the patent holder)
of high technology computer components holds several U.S. patents
on new technologies used in its components. Sales of components
using the patented technology began in November, 2002. Worldwide
sales exceed one million components per month of which 50% are
reasonably estimated to enter the U.S. market via direct sales of the
components into the United States, or indirectly through overseas
assembly of the components into finished electronic appliances which
themselves are sold directly into the United States.9
A competing overseas manufacturer (the competitor) begins
selling infringing components in January, 2003. The patent holder's
U.S. sales arm discovers the infringing activity upon reverse
engineering a finished electronics appliance using competitor's
components (purchased at a U.S. electronics store). The discovery is
made in December, 2003 and the patent holder's legal department
sends the competitor a letter in January, 2004 identifying both the
infringing components and the U.S. patents that it believes are
infringed by these components, and demanding that the competitor
cease the infringing conduct or take a license.10
The parties are unable to resolve their dispute through informal
business discussions and the patent holder files a suit for patent
infringement in May, 2004. The case is tried to a jury in January,
2007. The jury finds the competitor liable for patent infringement. A
9. Recovery of damages resulting from the infringement of U.S. patents is limited to
infringing activity that occurs within the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)
("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells... within the United States..
. infringes the patent."); see also MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("It is well-established that the reach of section
271(a) is limited to infringing activities that occur within the United States."). Hence, it is
important to determine that portion of the patent holders and competitor's worldwide sales that
directly or indirectly enter the United States.
10. The patent holder's correspondence is sufficient to provide actual notice under the
marking statute. See SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (finding the actual notice requirement is satisfied when the patentee informs the
recipient of the identity of both the allegedly infringed patent and the activity that is believed to
be an infringement and demands that the recipient cease the infringing conduct.) Due to the
extremely small size of the patent holder's components, the fact that these components are
"buried" several levels or more within finished electronic appliances, that the first sale and
several downstream assemblies thereafter precede entry into the United States, and that patent
holder often serves as an original equipment manufacturer ("OEM") to customers who do not
want third-party patent rights identified within their electronics, it is unrealistic to expect that
patent holder or its licensees would mark the component or the component packaging with the
patent number. In short, there is no constructive notice under the marking statute. Patent holder
therefore must rely upon actual notice to trigger the commencement of the damages accounting
period under the marking statute.
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timeline of the key dates leading up to the lawsuit is provided in
Figure 5, below.
i I I i
Infringing Notice Lawsuit Filed Trial
Sales Begin Jan. 2004 May 2004 Jan 2007
Jan. 2003
Fig. 5. Timeline
Price
$4.381
Infringing Notice Lawsuit Fed Trial Tuft
Sales Begin Jan- 2004 May 2004 Jan. 2007
Jan. 2003
Fig. 6. Eroded Prices
At of the time of trial, the price charged by the patent holder for
its components is $2.60 per unit, reflecting a significant decline over
time. In particular, the patent holder's price immediately prior to the
commencement of the infringing sales was $4.38. The price had
declined further to $3.48 as of the date the competitor received actual
notice, and continued to decline thereafter through the trial. The
reduced prices are depicted in Figure 6, above.
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Inf'nnging Notice Lawsuit Filed Trial Time
Sales Begin Jan. 2004 May 2004 Jan. 2007
Jan. 2003
Fig. 7. Compare with "But For" Prices
The patent holder acknowledges that the market for its
components is characterized by intense competition and a high level
of innovation, and that these market forces compel manufacturers
such as the patent holder to reduce their prices. In other words, even
absent the infringing competition, prices for the patent holder's
components would be expected to decline over time. However, the
patent holder saw a much sharper reduction in prices for those
components that compete directly with the competitor's infringing
products. Taking advantage of this difference, and using regression
techniques to control for irrelevant factors, expert economists
determined that, "but for" the illicit competition from the infringing
products, the price decline would have been more moderate and
similar to the trend observed for non-competing components. While
the economists differed regarding the exact amount, on average, there
was an expected decline of about 24 cents per year absent theinfringing competion. L" In Figure 7, above, the expected price
decline "but for" the infringement is contrasted with the sharper
11. For the sake of simplicity, we have abstracted from a non-linear trend and from the
relatively minor degree of difference between the economists on technical econometric grounds.
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decline of prices following commencement of the competitor's
infringing sales.
As of the commencement of the damages accounting period in
January 2004, the expected component price "but for" infringement
was $4.13, as compared with the lower "infringing" price of $3.48 at
which patent holder was forced to sell in response to competitor's
infringing conduct. The difference between these prices, already 65
cents per unit by the time of notice, multiplied by the millions of units
sold after notice was given, reflects the patent holder's true economic
loss from price erosion due to infringing competition. If the court's
methods of calculating price erosion damages allow consideration of
the depressed prices that pre-date the commencement of the damage
accounting period in January 2004, the damages recovered by the
patent holder will fully compensate its economic losses due to price
erosion. The patent holder's recoverable economic loss is the area is
depicted in Figure 8, below.
Price
"But For
Inriffnging Notice LaEwsit Filed Trial Time
Sales Begin Jan.2004 May 2004 Jan.2007
Jan.2003
Fig. 8. Post-Notice Economic Harm
However, the damages recovered by the patent holder are much
smaller if the court excludes from consideration the decline in prices
pre-dating the accounting period, i.e., where the court applies the
fiction that no reduction in prices due to infringing competition
2009] THE SHIFTING SANDS OF PRICE EROSION
occurred until the commencement of the accounting period. Under
these circumstances, the recoverable economic loss is limited to the
small area depicted in Figure 9, below.
Prce
eExpected Price Decline
St For" Infringement
148 ,Expected Price Decline
Legal Fiction Prices: Absent infringement
NOT Depressed
as of Beginning of
Accounting Period
,S2.60
in"rnIng Notice Lawsuit Filed Trial Time0
Sales Beglin Jan 2004 May 2004 Jan.2007
Jan.2003
Fig. 9. Limited Recovery Due to Legal Fiction
There is a large difference in the amount of price erosion
damages, depending upon which of these two alternatives is chosen
by the court. Assuming the patent holder's monthly sales are on the
order of a million units at infringement-depressed prices, and the
competitor's infringing sales are at commensurate levels, the potential
price erosion damages are $28 million if consideration of pre-notice
harm is allowed 12 and only $4.4 million if consideration of pre-notice
harm is not allowed. 13
12. See the area depicted in Figure 8. As discussed in Section IV. A. infra, recovery of
price erosion damages encompasses depressed prices on not only the patent holder's sales of
units that practice the invention, but also the competitor's infringing sales (patent holder's lost
profit on the diverted sales is increased to reflect the higher expected prices in the hypothetical
market free of infringement).
13. See area depicted in Figure 9.
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Fig. 10. Full Recovery of Economic Loss
Figure 10, above, demonstrates the dramatic shift in recovery
depending upon the calculation method applied by the court. in our
hypothetical, the patent holder seeks to recover damages
compensating all of its economic losses due to competitor's infringing
conduct, including the lost profits on the sales diverted to the
competitor and lost profits due to price erosion on all its sales that
affect the U.S. market. Our hypothetical patent holder seeks the
recovery reflected in Figure 8, above (encompassing both of the areas
in Figure 10). However, if the court refuises to allow consideration of
pre-notice price erosion, the patent holder's recovery is limited to the
smaller area reflected in Figure 9 (the smaller area shown in Figure
10).
III. TUTORIAL REGARDING DAMAGES CALCULATIONS
Before delving deeper into the admissibility of evidence of pre-
notice changes in prices, a high-level tutorial on calculating damages
will be beneficial.
A. Elements of Damages: Lost Profits and Reasonable Royalty
The patent statute provides for compensatory damages as
follows:
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Upon finding for the claimant, the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer .... 14
The statute does not instruct the courts how to calculate the
statutory damages. Accordingly, courts have filled the void through
statutory interpretation. They have interpreted the phrase "damages
adequate to compensate" as meaning 'full compensation for 'any
damages' [the patent owner] suffered as a result of the
infringement."'1 5 Courts also have determined that the statutory
measure of "damages" is the difference between the patent owner's
pecuniary condition after infringement, and what its condition would
have been if the infringement had not occurred. 16 Whatever method is
used by the patent holder to prove damages, it must use a method that
shows with "reasonable probability" their entitlement to damages.
17
The patentee cannot base its damage claim on "mere speculation and
guess. 18
There are two general categories of patent infringement
damages: lost profits and reasonable royalty.19 The first category, lost
profits, is the patent holder's actual damages.2 ° It encompasses profits
which the patent holder would have received had the infringement not
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
15. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (emphasis added) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983)).
16. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ("In patent cases, as in other commercial torts, damages are measured by inquiring:
had the tortfeasor not committed the wrong, what would have been the financial position of the
person wronged?" (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964) ("had the infringer not infringed, what would [the patentee] have made?"))).
17. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
18. Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931);
see also N.D. Cal. Model Patent Jury Instr. B.5.1 (Nov. 29, 2007) ("While [patent holder] is not
required to prove its damages with mathematical precision, it must prove them with reasonable
certainty. [Patent holder] is not entitled to damages that are remote or speculative.").
19. This is not to say that the relief available to the patent holder upon a finding of
infringement is limited to lost profits or reasonable royalty. Assuming infringement, the patent
holder also may be entitled to enhanced damages, see 35 U.S.C. § 284 2 (2006) (contingent
upon proof of willful infringement), attorney's fees, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (upon proving an
"exceptional case"), preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (in
accordance with equitable principles), and costs and pre-and post-judgment interests as allowed
under State and Federal statutes of general application. The latter categories of relief, i.e., those
other than compensatory money damages, while important, are not relevant to obtaining money
damages and therefore are outside the scope of this discussion.
20. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
736 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
occurred. 21 "The 'but for' inquiry therefore requires a reconstruction
of the market ... absent the infringing product .... In order "[t]o
prevent the hypothetical [nature of this enterprise] from lapsing into
pure speculation, . . . [the patent holder seeking lost profit damages
has the burden of providing] sound economic proof of the nature of
the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the
economic picture. 23 Consistent with the court's interpretation of the
statute as requiring full compensation for any damages, the patent
holder is entitled to recover "any foreseeable lost profits [that it] can
prove. 24 The patent holder is given "significant latitude to prove and
recover lost profits for a wide variety of foreseeable economic effects
of infringement.
25
If actual damages cannot be ascertained from the record, then, at
a minimum, the patent holder is entitled to a "reasonable royalty. '26 In
practice, damages are often awarded in both categories. To the extent
that lost profits are proven for some, but not all infringing sales, the
patent holder is still entitled to a reasonable royalty on the
remainder.27 It is well settled law that for calculating a reasonable
royalty, the time frame of interest is "the date when the infringement
began. 28 The appropriate time frame for calculating lost profits,
however, remains unsettled.29
21. id.
22. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Products Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1349 (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545-47 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
25. Id. at 1350.
26. Id. at 1349.
27. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed Cir. 1989); see
also Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Thus, a patentee may obtain lost profit damages for that portion of the
infringer's sales for which the patentee can demonstrate 'but for' causation and reasonable
royalties for any remaining infringing [sales].") (citing King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65
F.3d 941, 952-53 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
28. E.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
29. See e.g., Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.98-74495, 2002 WL
31008328, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2002), aff'd, No. 02-1623, 2003 WL 21479539, at **I
(Fed. Cir. June 20, 2003) (affirming district court's award of price erosion damages using pre-
damage period data). But see Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc.,
No. C.A. 04-1371-JJF, 2006 WL 2435084, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2006) (denying motion to
calculate price erosion damages using pre-notice data).
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B. Lost Profits Based On "Lost Sales"
This article focuses on lost profits, which itself can take several
different forms.3 ° One form of lost profits is "lost sales," and is based
upon sales of the patent holder that were diverted to the infringer due
to its infringing conduct.31 With respect to these "diverted sales," the
patent holder seeks to recapture the profits it would have made "but
for" the infringement.
32
C. Lost Profits Based on "Price Erosion"
In addition to "lost sales," "price erosion" is another well-
established form of lost profits. Courts have long-recognized the
causal relationship between infringing sales and depressed prices.33 A
competitor's infringing sales adversely affect the patent owner's
pecuniary condition by forcing the patent holder to reduce its prices in
order to better compete with the infringing competition, which in turn
reduces the patent owner's profits.34 As stated in the Supreme Court's
1886 decision Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent,35 when a plaintiff sells a
product covered by his patent, "reduction of prices and consequent
loss of profits, enforced by infringing competition, is a proper ground
for awarding damages. 36
Accordingly, there is substantial support in the caselaw for a
price erosion theory of patent infringement damages.37 In order to
30. The better recognized forms of lost profit damages are lost profits resulting from sales
lost or diverted to the accused infringer, price erosion resulting from the infringing competition,
and the patent holder's increased expenditures caused by infringement. See Lam, Inc. v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed Cir. 1983). Lost sales and price erosion are expressly
described in this article.
31. See Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating
that recovery of lost profits on diverted sales requires some showing by patent holder that, but
for the infringing activity, the patent holder would have made the infringer's sales).
32. See id.
33. See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F.
Supp. 1354, 1384 (N.D. I11. 1993) ("An infringer's activities do more than divert sales to the
infringer. They also depress the price."), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Kalman
v. Berlyn Corp., No. CIV. A. 82-0346-F, 1988 WL 156126, at *8 (D. Mass. July 25, 1988)
("When the relevant market includes only two competitors, one may infer that the patentee
would have charged higher prices but for the competition caused by the infringement."), affd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded 914 F.2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
34. See Section IV infra.
35. Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536 (1886).
36. Id. at 551.
37. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.2d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.
2001); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Brooktree Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Minn. Mining & Mfg.
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recover price erosion damages, the patentee must show that, if there
had been no infringement (i.e., "but for" infringement), it would have
sold its products at higher prices.3 8 In addition, credible economic
analysis of price erosion requires that the patentee present evidence of
the (presumably reduced) amount of product the patentee would have
sold at the higher price3 9
In calculating price erosion damages, courts have made a point
of considering the economic principle of price elasticity. 40 This
principle describes the relationship between price and demand-the
more elastic the market, the greater the drop in demand upon an
increase in prices. 4 1 Conversely, if the market is inelastic, an increase
in price will not result in lower demand.42 Thus, a patent holder
seeking to recover price erosion damages must present evidence of
the reduced amount of product the patent holder would have sold at
the higher price in the "but for" market free of infringing
43
competition.
Price erosion damages encompass both the profits the patent
holder loses on the sales that it continues to make (sometimes referred
to as "lost price opportunity" or "lost margin" sales) as well as the
profits the patent holder loses on the sales "lost" to the infringer."
Another way of stating this observation is that price erosion refers to
depressed prices on not only the units of sales lost, but also for the
units of sales made by the patent holder.
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Lam,
Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
38. Ericsson, 352 F.2d at 1378 (citing BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc.,
I F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
39. See id at 1378 (citing Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1357).
40. See, e.g., Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1359; Minn. Mining, 976 F.2d at 1578-
79; In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F. Supp. 1354,
1389 (N.D. 11. 1993), affd 71 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
41. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REv. 937, 939-40 (1981) (describing relations among elasticity of demand, market
share, cost, and price).
42. Id.
43. See Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1356 ("[I]n a credible economic analysis, the
patentee cannot show entitlement to a higher price divorced from the effect of that higher price
on demand for the product. In other words, the patentee must also present evidence of the
(presumably reduced) amount of product the patentee would have sold at the higher price.").
44. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.2d 1369, 1376-78 (awarding damages for
lost sales and lost profits due to price erosion); see also David L. Applegate, A Billion Here and
Billion There: Talking Real Money in the Patent Damages Case, 910 PRACTICING L. INST. 1367,
1380-81 (2007).
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That lost sales and price erosion are both measures of lost
profits, and, further, that price erosion encompasses eroded prices on
both "lost sales" and "made sales," is depicted in Figure 11, below.
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Fig. 11. Elements of Damages
The same relationships can be demonstrated by mapping them
against the price and coordinates, as in Figure 12, below. Figure 12
also includes the adjustment typically made by economists (and
required by the courts) for price elasticity, namely that as prices
increase, there typically is some amount of a reduction in demand.45
Price erosion damages are not awarded as often as lost profits
based upon lost sales,46 reflecting the stringent proof requirements
45. For almost all goods (normal goods), a fall in the price will result in more being
purchased and vice versa. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 4, at 120-21. This is
sometimes referred to as "The Law of Downward-Sloping Demauid" See PAUL A. SAMUELSON
& WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 39 (15th ed. 1995).
46. See Gregory J. Werden et al., Quantity Accretion: Mirror Image of Price Erosion
from Patent Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 479, 480 (1999) (citing Ronald
B. Cooley, Overview and Statistical Study of the Law on Patent Damages, 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 515, 518 (1993)).
Lost Profits
r Prc rso
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associated with this theory of recovery.47 From an economic
perspective, "awards for price erosion should be more routine.,
48
Nonetheless, where patentees and their experts have been able to
muster sufficient supporting evidence, they have often obtained jury
awards for price erosion damages exceeding tens of millions of
dollars or more. 49 Furthermore, it is not uncommon for price erosion
to be the single largest portion of the overall damage recovery. ° This
is due in no small part to the fact that recovery for price erosion is
allowed in connection with both "lost sales" and "made sales." 51
47. As discussed above, the patentee has the burden of proving price erosion damages by
"sound economic proof" This proof includes, among other things, proof that the patentee
reduced prices in response to the infringing competition as well as proof of the specific amount
of the price reduction, see Vulcan Eng. Co., Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2002), and the presentation of evidence on whether the market is inelastic (higher
prices would not result in reduced demand) or elastic (higher prices result in reduced demand),
see Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1359.
48. See Werden et al., supra note 46, at 480 ("[A]wards for price erosion should be more
routine. One would always expect some price effect from competition between the patentee and
the infringer, since competition between two firms nearly always results in a lower price.").
49. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976
F.2d 1559, 1578-82 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming district court judgment of $29 million for price
erosion); Honeywell Int'l., Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1019 (D.
Del. 2001) (trial court denied accused infringer's post-trial motion to set aside jury award of $45
million for price erosion damages), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds and
remanded, 370 F.2d 1131, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Gen.
Scanning Inc., 247 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming denial ofjudgment as a matter of law
on the jury's award of $13.1 million for lost profits and price erosion damages); Atmel Corp. v.
Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., Nos. 02-1522, 02-1523, 2003 WL 22129398, at **13 (Fed. Cir. Sep.
12, 2003) (affirming entry of judgment on jury verdict for price erosion damages of
$10,400,000); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 761 F. Supp. 1420, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(awarding price erosion damages of $14,649,084); Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d
1318, 1324-26 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming entry of judgment on jury award of price erosion
damages of $2,984,202). See also Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1358 (affirming trial
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to invalidate jury verdict of $26,649,766 for price
erosion damages); Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., No. C 98-20451 JF (EAI), 2007 WL
2255220, at * 10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (granting judgment as a matter of law, and thereby,
nullifying a jury award of $43.2 million for price erosion damages due to insufficient evidence
to support a finding of liability); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc.,
589 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (D. Del. 2008) (granting post-trial motion to remit jury award of
$14,971,272 for price erosion damages by 80% consistent with pro rata share of infringing
products entering the United States).
50. See, e.g., Minn. Mining, 976 F.2d at 1578 ($28,923,219 for price erosion damages out
of total award of $53,636,348); Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1324 ($2,984,202 for price erosion damages
out of total award of $3,098,962); Atmel Corp., 2003 WL 22129398 at **7 ($10,400,000 for
price erosion damages out of total award of $19,969,000); Honeywell, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 10 13-
14 ($45 million for price erosion damages out of total award of $46.6 million); Micro Motion.,
761 F. Supp. at 1435 ($14,649,084 for price erosion damages out of total award of
$20,821,520).
51. See Applegate, supra note 44, at 1380-81.
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D. The Accounting Period for Damage Recovery
The amount of damages a patentee may recover in an
infringement suit is limited under the marking statute5 2 to acts of
infringement that occur after the patentee gives the alleged infringer
notice of infringement.53 The marking statute provides in part:
PRICE
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Fig. 12. Economist View of Patent Damages
(a) Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling
within the United States any patented article for or under them, or
importing any patented article into the United States, may give
notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing
thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with
the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article,
this cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one
or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In
the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by
the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that
the infiinger was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only
52. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
53. Id.
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for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for
infringement shall constitute such notice.
54
"The statute permits either constructive notice, which is
accomplished by marking the article or its packaging with the patent
number, or actual notice."5 5 "[T]he actual notice requirement of §
287(a) is satisfied when the recipient is informed of the identity of the
[allegedly infringed] patent and the activity that is believed to be an
infringement, accompanied by a proposal to abate the infringement,
whether by license or otherwise. 5 6 A "proposal to abate" is broadly
interpreted to encompass a threat by the patentee to file suit, a
demand by the patentee to cease the infringing conduct, or an offer by
the patentee to license the patent.
5 7
1. Purpose of the Marking Statute
The marking statute serves three related purposes: "1) helping to
avoid innocent infringement; 2) encouraging patentees to give notice
to the public that the article is patented; and 3) aiding the public to
identify whether an article is patented., 5 8 In order to further these
purposes, Congress structured the marking statute so as to tie failure
to mark with the inability to collect damages prior to notice. 9
54. Id. The notice provisions in the marking statute do not apply in situations where there
is no tangible item to be marked. Accordingly, neither marking nor actual notice is required if
the asserted patent claim is directed to a method or process (as opposed to a tangible product or
apparatus that is capable of being marked). Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d
1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Similarly, under the predecessor of § 287, even if the asserted
claim is directed to a product or apparatus, the notice requirements do not apply if the patent
holder does not sell a product covered by the claim. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry.
Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936) (interpreting the predecessor marking statute of 35 U.S.C.
§ 287). In these situations, damages are calculated as of the date infringement began or the
patent issues, whichever is later. See N.D. Cal. Model Patent Jury Instr. B.5.8 (Nov. 29, 2007).
See also Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1353 (granting damages to patentee from the date
the infringing activity began since the asserted patent claims were only directed to a method,
and neither the marking nor actual notice requirements were applicable).
55. Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 718, 724
(D. Del. 2007).
56. SRI Int'l. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
57. See id.
58. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
59. Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537 ("Congress structured the statute so as to tie failure to
mark with disability to collect damages .... Furthermore, allowing recovery of damages from
the point of full compliance with the marking statute further the policy of encouraging marking
to provide notice to the public .... ").
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2. Affirmative Act by Patentee
The notice required by the marking statute must come from the
patentee; it must be an affirmative act by patentee that informs the
defendant of infringement. 60 The rationale for requiring an affirmative
act by the patentee is that it furthers the marking statute's purpose of
helping the alleged infringer avoid infringement (the first of the three
marking statute purposes identified above). 6' As explained by the
Federal Circuit, absent affirmative notification from the patentee, the
62
alleged infringer may lack knowledge of the patentee's identity.
Consequently the accused infringer "may lose the opportunity to
consult with the patentee about non-infringing design changes, to
negotiate a valid license, or to seek an early adjudication of rights in a
declaratory judgment proceeding-all or any of which could facilitate
the avoidance of infringement.63
3. Related Rules Regarding the Commencement of
Damages
There are, of course, rules other than the notice provisions in the
marking statute that limit the period for which patent infringement
damages may be recovered. For example, the well-established rule is
that the patentee's right to exclude others from practicing the patented
invention does not inure until the patent issues. 64 Thus, the patentee
may obtain damages only for acts of infringement occurring after the
patent issues.65 Furthermore, damages may not be recovered for
infringing sales made "more than six years prior to the filing of the
complaint or counterclaim for infringement., 66 The patent statute
limits how far the patentee can "look back" for purposes of
60. Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no
affirmative act by patentee and therefore no actual notice, even though the accused infringer did
in fact receive notice of alleged infringement from a party associated with patentee); see also
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537 (finding notice to alleged infringer by its own counsel does not
satisfy the marking statute); Crown Packaging Tech., 498 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (finding alleged
infringer's knowledge of infringement irrelevant to whether patentee met statutory requirement
for notice).
61. See Lans, 252 F.3d at 1327.
62. Id.
63. Id. ("Thus, without knowledge of the patentee's identity, an alleged infringer may
lose the benefit of this primary purpose [helping avoid infringement] of the notice
requirement.").
64. Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
65. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing
Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 66 F.3d 299, 304 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006).
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recovering damages on prior infringing sales or other prior infringing
conduct.67
4. Instructing the Jury: Commencement of Damages
In jury trials for patent infringement, the rules relating to the
commencement of the damages accounting period are typically
incorporated in a single jury instruction. For example, in the Northern
District of California, where the patentee sells a product that includes
the claimed invention, but has not marked the product with the patent
number, the jury is instructed that "[d]amages that... may be
awarded by you commence on the date that [the] [alleged
infringer] .... received actual written notice."68 The jury is also
instructed that "damages should be calculated as of' the later of the
date the infringing activity began or the date the patent issued.69 In
comparison, where there is no disagreement regarding the date from
which the damages calculation should begin, the court may simply
instruct the jury to preclude recovery of damages prior a specific date,
as a court from the District of Delaware instructed in Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.
70
IV. THE ECONOMIST'S PERSPECTIVE ON PRICE EROSION
A. Infringing Conduct Causes Economic Harm in the Form of
Depressed Prices
The fact that competing sales generally depress prices is an
accepted principle in the field of economics. 71 For example, one
economist stated: "To an economist, . . . awards for price erosion
should be more routine. One would always expect some price effect
from competition between the patentee and the infringer, since
competition between two firms nearly always results in a lower
price. 72 Similarly, Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus state that
in a perfectly competitive market, "[a]n increase in the supply of a
commodity (the demand curve being constant) will generally lower
67. Id.; see also Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345,
348 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
68. N.D. Cal. Model Patent Jury Instr. B.5.8 Patent Damages (Nov. 29, 2007).
69. Id.
70. Memorandum Order at 2, Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l.,
Inc., C.A. No. 04-1371-JJF (D. Del. June 2, 2006) (order granting defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment precluding the plaintiff from recovering damages prior to specific date).
71. See Werden et al., supra note 46, at 480.
72. Id.
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the price and increase the quantity bought and sold., 73 With
reasonable assumptions, the same is generally true for many varieties
of imperfectly competitive markets as well.
74
B. Pre-Commencement Economic Data Can Be Relevant for
Estimating the Full Economic Loss Due to Infringement
The loss of profits due to competition is an economic fact,
irrespective of whether the competition is lawful and whether the loss
is compensable if it is unlawful. Economic harm due to infringing
competition is an economic fact as soon as the infringing competition
begins. However, the law may limit the recovery of lost profits
damages to a time period that starts later than the first infringing
activity. 5 The law may also limit the time period of damages to end
at the date of an injunction.76 Despite these legal limitations, the
economic analysis of the impact of competition, and its data
requirements, remain the same.
In general, economists expect that the impact of "increased
competition"-that is, the entry of a new supplier into a particular
market-is to lower the price in the market and increase the total
quantity sold.77 The competitive impact on an incumbent competitor
(such as a patentee), therefore, would usually involve lower profits
not just from losing sales to the new competitor, but also from
receiving a lower price on all its goods.78 This is most easily
73. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 45, at 144.
74. Imperfectly competitive markets involve one seller (monopoly) or a relatively small
number of sellers, such that some degree of power to set prices exists. The fact that competitive
entry is usually associated with price declines is perhaps most clearly seen in the inverse
situation of a merger analysis, which looks at how much consumer prices would likely increase
if a merger that removes a competitor is allowed to occur. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18-22 (1997). The same principles can be
used to look at how much consumer prices would likely decrease due to the entry of a new
(infringing) competitor. See generally Gregory J. Werden et al., Lost Profits from Patent
Infringement: The Simulation Approach, 7 INT'L J. ECON. BuS. 213 (2000).
75. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
76. Damages for patent infringement are at least "the reasonable royalty for the use of the
invention by the infringer." See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (emphasis added). While the patent
statute grants courts the authority to enjoin the infringing use, see 35 U.S.C. § 283, the entry of
the injunction "prevents the violation of any right secured by the patent" and therefore cuts off
legally recoverable damages as of the effective date of the injunction. See id. Cf Amado v.
Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353,1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the trial court entered a
permanent injunction following jury verdict for patent holder, but the injunction was stayed
pending appeal, such that the infringing use of the patent continued, thereby extending the
damage period to include the additional, post-verdict infringing use).
77. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 4, at 295.
78. See id at 350-55 (discussing "marginal revenue").
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illustrated in the case of "competitive markets." A competitive market
is one where individual sellers and buyers have little "market power,"
that is, very little ability to individually affect the market price.79 The
"market mechanism" is the tendency of markets to reach equilibrium
(a stable balance of forces) by changing the price until the quantity
freely offered for sale equals the quantity freely accepted for
purchase.80 The quantity suppliers freely offer for sale, however,
depends not just on price received but also on their costs. 8 At
equilibrium, the market clears and there is no further tendency for
prices and quantities to change.82 But if, for example, the supply
curve shifts rightward because of the entry into the market of a new
competitor, with other things held constant, the market mechanism
would produce a movement to a new equilibrium, at a lower price,
and a larger amount of goods traded, as shown in Figures 13A and
13B.83
Figure 13A Figure 13B
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Fig. 13A & 13B. Disruption of Equilibrium Due to Infringing Competition
In determining the loss of profits for a particular firm due to
competition, an economist employs a number of well-recognized
analytical tools. The fundamental tool is supply and demand
estimation. Once supply and demand are estimated, it becomes
79. Id. at 26.
80. Id. at 25.
81. Id. at 23.
82. Id. at 25.
83. See id. at 26-27.
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possible to predict what price and quantity the firm would obtain, for
example, in the absence of the market entry of an infringing
competitor. For reasonably modest changes in price and quantity,
estimating linear supply and demand curves, along with "elasticities,"
(on a proportional basis, how supply and demand respond to price
changes) provides an analytic framework84 (over time, in the absence
of a sufficient amount of price and quantity information, it may be
useful to engage in a case study such as comparing price changes to
appropriate benchmarks).85 For larger changes in price and quantity, a
statistical technique commonly referred to as "regression analysis"
provides more accurate estimates of changes in supply and demand
and also allows the researcher to control for outside events such as the
behavior of demand in the industry or the economy as a whole, or
changes in input prices.86
All of these techniques require the consideration of historical
prices, quantities, and costs for particular products of a firm or firms
in a particular market. 87 Profits, by definition, are the difference
between revenue (price times quantity) and costs. 88 Estimating a loss
in profits due to competition, therefore, requires estimating the
change in the market price due to the new competition, and the
change in the sales quantity for the firm. The typical result is a
decrease in firm revenues from lower quantities sold and/or lower
prices (frequently both), together with a decrease in costs due to lower
sales.89 In economic terms, price and quantity are inextricably linked
and must be estimated together. 90 However, it is not uncommon to
refer to these separately, with the quantity change as "lost sales" and
the price change as "price erosion." 9' In order to statistically
determine the impact of an event such as the beginning of infringing
84. See id. at 49-50.
85. Jean Tirole, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 4 (1988).
86. See generally PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 4, at 687-92.
87. Id. at 689.
88. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 45, at 24.
89. This expectation with respect to price follows logically from the discussion so far
about the likely impact of competitive entry. See supra Section IV.A.
90. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 4, at 49.
91. For example, the rules applied by the courts to measure compensatory damages, as
discussed above, distinguish between lost profits based on the greater quantity of sales (i.e. "lost
sales." that would have been made "but for" infringement), see Crystal Semiconductor Corp.v.
Tritech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001), from lost profits
based on price erosion, or "the actual cost of goods and the potential price-the price they could
have realized had there been no competition from the infringers," see In re Mahurkar Double
Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1386 (N.D. II1. 1993).
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competition, it is important to obtain as much relevant data as
possible. Such data would ideally precede the infringing competition
as well as go beyond it; it would also include prices of substitute
goods as well as costs. At the very least, if the data are limited to the
competing products prices, it would be critical to know prices before
and after the onset of infringing competition.
Ideally, such data would extend back in time (well before the
first infringement) and extend to the present. Data limited to a shorter
and more recent time period, perhaps because of legal mandates,
would make the analysis more difficult to undertake. For example, in
a two firm market, the entry impact of the infringer on the market
price would provide a key data point. If this infringement occurs
before the legally mandated damages period, it would be preferable to
have data including the commencement of infringement in order to
draw a more reliable conclusion about price erosion. Longer periods
of historical price observations can also result in more reliable
controls for events apart from the infringement in question that may
be affecting prices-such as prices of inputs, industry sales trends, and
the general economy. Once this infringing competition begins, the
market comes to a new equilibrium (which may or may not be stable),
and it is the difference between this new equilibrium and the one
prevailing before that constitutes the price erosion component of
damages. Therefore, profit loss due to lower prices is an economic
fact arising from competition, irrespective of a legal limitation on the
period of time for which damages are recoverable.
C. Pre-Commencement Data on Prices Has a Significant Effect
on the Amount of Price Erosion Damages
It is not uncommon that the patent holder was first to market and
enjoys a large market share, if not an outright monopoly. In such a
situation, a new and allegedly infringing competitor would typically
begin with a smaller market share. This smaller market share would
imply relatively modest lost sales at least initially, but it may imply a
much larger negative impact on prices. 92 Whether or not prices are
affected depends upon the nature of the competition between the
firms and the elasticity of demand;93 the elasticity of demand informs
the economist of the sensitivity of quantities bought and sold to
92. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSs, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 356-60 (3rd ed. 1990).
93. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 4, at 367.
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changes in price.94 Even if there is a modest impact on prices, the
price erosion component of the competitive impact may be large
because it affects not just lost sales, but all of the sales of the patent
holder.95 Again, one of the best ways of estimating this impact is to
include the commencement of infringement in the analysis-even if
that commencement preceded the legally mandated damages period.
V. THERE IS SPARSE AND POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING LEGAL
AUTHORITY REGARDING THE USE OF PRE-COMMENCEMENT
DATA ON PRICES
A brief examination of the respective roles of judge and jury
demonstrates that it is the judge, not the jury, who decides whether to
allow consideration of pre-notice economic harm.
96
With respect to price erosion, the jury is responsible for making
findings of fact, including determining whether the infringing sales
caused price erosion, and the amount of price erosion damages. 97 The
jury's damage award, whether for damages generally or price erosion
damages specifically, is not often overturned or modified on post-
verdict review.98 Where supported by substantial evidence, the jury's
damage award must be upheld unless the amount is grossly excessive
or based solely on speculation.99 In assessing whether the jury's
damage award is supported by substantial evidence, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
(the patentee), and the non-movant must be given the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. 00 Thus, the jury's verdict on the existence and
94. Id. at 34.
95. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Applegate,
supra note 44, at 1380-81.
96. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1577 (Fed. Cit. 1992); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-77
(Fed. Cit. 1989) ("Deciding how much to award as damages is not an exact science, and the
methodology of assessing and computing damages is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court.").
97. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
98. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 397 (2000) (revealing that the Federal Circuit affirms jury
fact findings in 78% of all jury issues appealed).
99. See Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed Cir.
2001); Brooktree, 977 F.2d at 1580.
100. See Ericsson, 352 F.3d at 1373 (citing Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc.,
226 F.3d 1280, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373
F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
749
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amount of price erosion damages must stand and should not be
modified or overturned on review unless, upon evaluating the record
in accordance with these principles, the court finds that no reasonable
juror could have reached this verdict.101
In comparison, certain subsidiary decisions underlying a damage
theory-such as choosing between reasonable alternative accounting
methods for determining profit margin or adopting a reasonable way
to determine the number of infringing units-are discretionary with the
trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court
abused its discretion.10 2 Thus, the issue of whether to consider sales
data pre-dating the accounting period likely falls within the district
court's discretion.
In Power Integrations,10 3 the trial court excluded evidence of
sales, financial data, or other conditions that pre-dated the damage
period from the calculation of price erosion damages. 10 4 In reaching
its decision, the court cited Johnson Electric North America, Inc. v.
Nabuchi Motor America Corp.10 5 for the proposition that damage
calculations based on estimated price erosion occurring prior to the
period of actual notice are invalid. 0 6 The Power Integrations court
stated: "Specifically, the [Johnson] court concluded that the plaintiff
could not calculate price erosion from the time the alleged infringer
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.")
(quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
101. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50. A major reason for the high rate of affirmance of jury fact
findings on things such as infringement and the amount of damage is this "deferential standard
of review." See Moore, supra note 98, at 400-01. Other contributing factors are the lack of
transparency in jury findings, and the related inability of the trial court to mandate special
verdicts such that, on appeal, the Federal Circuit has limited ability to identify and correct jury
inadequacies. See Moore, supra note 98, at 400-01.
102. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-
77 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Deciding how much to award as damages is not an exact science, and the
methodology of assessing and computing damages is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court.").
103. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., C.A. No. 04-1371-JJF
(D. Del. June 2, 2006).
104. Memorandum Order Document 265 at 1-3, Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., C.A. No. 04-1371-JJF (D. Del. June 2, 2006) (order granting
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment precluding plaintiff' recovery of damages
prior to date of actual notice), aff'd, Memorandum Order Document 329 at 1, C.A. No. 04-1371-
JJF (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2006) (order denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's prior
partial summary judgment order in favor of defendant).
105. Johnson Electric N. Am., Inc. v. Nabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
106. Memorandum Order Document 265 at 3-4, Power Integrations, C.A. No. 04-1371-
JJF.
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entered the market, because the market entry date preceded the date of
compliance with the marking statute.' ' 10 7 Neither Power Integrations
nor Johnson was appealed to the Federal Circuit. Thus, we do not
have the benefit of the Federal Circuit's review of these decisions.
In comparison, the district court, in Vulcan Engineering Co., Inc.
v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 08 awarded patent infringement damages for
price erosion based upon evidence of offers for sale made prior to the
damage accounting period. 09 Thus, the scarce authority regarding
whether to include pre-accounting period evidence for price erosion
calculations is conflicting.
VI. THIE CASE AGAINST ALLOWING PRE-COMMENCEMENT DATA ON
PRICES TO BE USED IN CALCULATING PRICE EROSION DAMAGES
While infringing activities occurring prior to notice may very
well cause erosion in prices of the patented article, one could
reasonably argue that not all of this loss should be legally recoverable.
In fact, this section focuses on the legal arguments that explain why
post-notice damages resulting from pre-notice price erosion have not
become commonplace. One argument is that the plain language of the
statute seems, on its face, to deny all data prior to the date of
notice.' 10 It certainly makes calculations easier when all data prior to
notice is excluded for whatever reason. The sparse legal authority on
this issue appears to exclude pre-notice data for at least this reason. A
second argument is that while calculations of reasonable royalty often
include a pre-notice time frame, the time frame for calculating actual
damages (which include price erosion) does not necessarily need to
follow suit. The premise of a reasonable royalty calculation logically
requires looking at the time of a hypothetical negotiation between the
patent owner and a prospective user." The "legal fiction" of the
reasonable royalty calculation thus requires looking back to a time
frame before the infringer entered the market.' 12 However, calculation
of actual damages does not require looking back in order to prove that
damage actually occurred. As the losses are ongoing, post-notice
107. Id.
108. Vulcan Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.98-74495, 2002 WL
31008328 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2002), arid, No. 02-1623, 2003 WL 21479539 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
109. See id. at *3.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
11. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also TWM
Mfg. Co., v., Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
112. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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losses exist, and looking back at pre-notice loss is not required to find
at least some loss. Perhaps excluding pre-notice loss creates an
incentive for prompt notice. As such, a third argument is that, drawing
a bright line rule creates a legal incentive to encourage prompt notice
by the patent holder. One policy reason for requiring notice is to help
avoid innocent infringement, 13 so if a patent holder is economically
motivated, he will likely inform an innocent infringer early. Thus, not
looking back for price erosion calculations is an additional economic
motivation for a patent owner to promptly notify an alleged infringer.
Two lower court cases have directly addressed whether pre-
notice data should be included in price erosion calculations."14 Both of
these courts determined that pre-notice data should not be
considered." 5 Thus, although the Federal Circuit has yet to weigh in
on this issue, current legal precedent weighs in favor of excluding
pre-notice data in price erosion calculations.
In 2000, the Southern District of New York held in Johnson
Electric that "[the plaintiff] may not seek damages for any acts of
infringement committed prior to [the date of notice] and to the extent
that [the damages expert] based his damages computations on [the
infringer's] activities before that date, his conclusions are fatally
flawed."' 16 In 2006, the U.S. District Court of Delaware, in Power
Integrations, also excluded pre-notice data in price erosion
calculations based on the Johnson Electric decision." 7 Specifically, in
Power Integrations, the patent holder contended that the marking
statute did not preclude the use of pre-notice sales data to calculate
the rate of price erosion and that Johnson Electric was wrongly
decided. 18 As such, the patent holder brought a motion for the court
to reconsider its order limiting damages calculations to conditions
occurring on or after the notice date."l 9 However, the court denied
their motion, finding that Johnson Electric was, at least, not a clearly
erroneous decision.
120
113. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
114. Johnson Elec. N. Am. Inc. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 2006 WL
2435084, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2006).
115. Johnson, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 280; Power Integrations, 2006 WL 2435084, at *2.
116. Johnson, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
117. Power Integrations, 2006 WL 2435084, at *2.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *2.
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One reason apparently relied upon by the courts for excluding
pre-notice data in price erosion calculations is the plain language of
the damages statute itself. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) states:
In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered
by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that
the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only
for infringement occurring after such notice.121
This language clearly states that damages cannot be recovered
for infringement occurring prior to notice. Therefore, since price
erosion is one measurement of damages, any data regarding infringing
activity occurring prior to notice also cannot be considered. The
Johnson Electric court seemed to use this reasoning when it stated:
"Price erosion is merely one measure of damages and thus, to the
extent it occurred prior to compliance with the patent marking statute,
cannot be considered."
' 122
Some courts have stated that the statute bars recovery of all
damages, no matter what type of calculation is used. 123 For example,
the Nike 12 4 court stated: "The statutory history establishes that the
marking requirement has always applied, and continues to apply, to
both recovery of the infringer's profit under § 289, and recovery of
damages, however measured, under § 284."'125 This would, therefore,
necessarily include price erosion-based damages. In fact, the Johnson
court specifically states: "[the patent holder] cannot recover any
damages, including those for price erosion, for the acts committed
121. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). Section 287(a) states in full:
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United
States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article
into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented,
either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together
with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this
cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is
contained, a label containing a like notice. In the event of failure so to mark, no
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except
on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to
infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for
infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for infringement
shall constitute such notice.
122. Johnson Elec. N. Am. Inc. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
123. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Johnson, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 280-81.
124. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
125. Id. at 1440 (emphasis added).
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prior to [the date of notice]." 126 Thus, it seems that there is support in
the case law for excluding price-erosion data prior to notice.
While there is ample support for looking prior to notice for
reasonable royalty calculations, there is little or no support for doing
so for price erosion calculations. The distinction between the two is
reasonable given their differing purposes. Price erosion is a type of
lost profit calculation-which comes from a "but for" analysis-and is a
measure of actual damages caused by infringement.' 27 In contrast, the
reasonable royalty measure of damages is merely a "legal fiction.' 28
It is a last resort (floor) that patentees are allowed when they are
unable to sufficiently prove any actual damages. 29 The reasonable
royalty is intended to be the amount "which a person, desiring to
manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition,
would be willing to pay as a royalty.' 30 Thus, the negotiation must be
assumed to be "between the patent owner and the prospective
[user].',3 As such, "[t]he key element in setting a reasonable
royalty... is the necessity for return to the date when the
infringement began."' 
32
On the other hand, actual damages-which include price erosion-
must be proven as the actual loss suffered by the patent holder as a
"but for" result of the infringement. 133 As stated above, the amount of
damages recoverable is limited by statute to those incurred after
notice is given.'3 4 Pre-notice price erosion calculations assume that
prices erode as soon as the competing infringing product enters the
market. Thus, the premise is that the baseline as of the date of notice
is lower than it would have been absent infringement. In other words,
in order to recover, the patent holder has to prove that pre-notice
infringement actually caused prices to erode during the pre-notice
time frame. Therefore, allowing proof of pre-notice price erosion
126. Johnson, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
127. Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing BIC
Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., I F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
128. Panduit Corp v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1978).
129. See Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
130. Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1157-58 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1973)).
131. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
132. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1158).
133. Ericsson, Inc., v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing BIC
Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., I F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
134. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
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takes into account a loss that was incurred during the pre-notice
timeframe, which is precisely what the marking statute forbids. As
such, it is logical to limit the data used in a price erosion calculation
to events occurring only after notice, while still using a pre-notice
time frame for reasonable royalty calculations.
Finally, the policy considerations weigh in favor of not allowing
pre-notice data. The marking statute serves three related purposes: "1)
helping to avoid innocent infringement; 2) encouraging patentees to
give notice to the public that the article is patented; and 3) aiding the
public to identify whether an article is patented."' 135 In order to further
these purposes, Congress structured the marking statute so as to tie
failure to mark with the inability to collect damages prior to notice.
136
These purposes strongly encourage patent owners to mark their
products and promptly notify infringers if the product is not marked.
It is in the best interest of society for companies to not spend the
development and manufacturing costs on a product that they are not
allowed to make. It is a waste of resources that the company could
have used to make another product. It seems only fair that if the
patent owner has an exclusive right to make and sell a particular item,
the patent owner also has the responsibility to promptly notify
infringers before unnecessary resources are wasted in the second
company's production of the patented product. A company that
allows unnecessary expenditures by the second company should, at
the very least, be unable to recover damages during its time of
inattention and carelessness.
For at least the reasons stated above, it may be legally reasonable
to disallow pre-notice data when calculating price erosion damages.
The admittedly sparse legal authority indicates that pre-notice data
should not be used. Although the rationale provided in these cases is
limited, there are a several reasons for limiting such data. First, the
statute states that "damages may be recovered only for infringement
occurring after notice," and as such, all pre-notice data should
similarly be excluded. Second, although damages under a reasonable
royalty calculation look to infringing activities occurring prior to
notice, this is due to a special "legal fiction" floor calculation that is
135. Nike, Inc., v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
136. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("Congress structured the statute so as to tie failure to mark with disability to collect damages..
. .Furthermore, allowing recovery of damages from the point of full compliance with the
marking statute furthers the policy of encouraging marking to provide notice to the public ...
.1').
756 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.i. [Vol. 25
not necessary for price erosion damages. Finally, limiting price
erosion recovery in this way creates an additional economic incentive
for patent holders to provide early notice to infringers.
VII.THE CASE FOR ALLOWING PRE-COMMENCEMENT DATA ON
PRICES TO BE USED IN CALCULATING PRICE EROSION DAMAGES
Although case authority on this issue is sparse, at least one
District Court has allowed evidence of prices prior to the accounting
period to be used for calculating price erosion damages. In Vulcan
Engineering Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 13 7 the patent holder's
damage expert was allowed to base his calculation of price erosion
damages on offers for sale made before the patent holder gave the
infringer actual notice of infringement. 38 The plaintiff held a patent
on a casting line system used in the manufacture of automobiles and
found itself bidding against a competing system offered by the
defendant.1 39 The competition from the defendant forced the plaintiff
to lower its bids.1 40 During the bidding process, the plaintiff believed
that the defendant's competing system necessarily infringed
plaintiffs patent, prompting the plaintiff to notify the customer of its
suspicions.14' The customer forwarded the plaintiffs belief on to the
defendant, and the defendant, nonetheless, proceeded to sell an
infringing system to the customer. 42 Following remand from appeal,
the District Court awarded plaintiff lost profits on the lost sale to the
defendant as well as price erosion damages on both the lost sales to
the defendant and other sales made by plaintiff. 43 The price erosion
damages were based on the District Court's finding that the infringing
competition forced plaintiff to lower its prices and that this would not
have been necessary "but for" the infringement.1 44 The sole evidence
relied upon by the District Court in calculating the amount of price
erosion damages was that, prior to notice, plaintiff lowered the price
137. Vulcan Eng'g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.98-74495, 2002 WL 31008328,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2002), affd, No. 02-1623, 2003 WL 21479539, at **1 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
138. Id.
139. Vulcan Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
140. Id. at 1377 n.2.
141. Id. at 1371.
142. Id.
143. Vulcan Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.98-74495, 2002 WL
31008328 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2002), aff'd, No. 02-1623, 2003 WL 21479539, at **1 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
144. Id. at *2.
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of its casting system line in response to defendant's infringing
conduct. 1
45
On appeal, the defendant challenged the award of price erosion
damages on the grounds that the marking statute barred such damages
"based on the effects of pre-notice infringing offers,"' 146 and that the
marking statute "does [not] define any circumstances under which
recoverable damages can derive from a pre-notice act of
infringement." 147 The defendant's arguments apparently fell on deaf
ears as the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's award in an
unpublished per curiam decision.
1 48
Implicit in Vulcan is the recognition that whatever the damages
accounting period, the patentee is entitled to recover the full measure
of damages suffered during this period. 149 Refusing to allow
consideration of pre-notice prices in the course of calculating the
recovery for post-notice infringement contravenes the strong policies
favoring full compensation of the injured patentee. 50
Furthermore, the plain language of the marking statute precludes
only the recovery of damages on pre-notice infringing activities. The
statute states in pertinent part:
In the event of failure to so mark, no damages shall be
recovered.., except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event
damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after
such notice. 151
The marking statute does not address the manner in which the
cause or amount of damages may be proven. 152 It does not address the
145. Id.
146. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 11, Vulcan Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc.,
No. 02-1623 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2002).
147. Id. at 13.
148. Vulcan Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., No. 02-1623, 2003 WL 21479539, at
**l (Fed. Cir. June 20, 2003).
149. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1982) (noting that while
enacting § 284, "Congress sought to ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full
compensation for 'any damages' he suffered a result of the infringement"); Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544-48 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (accepting the patentees argument that "[a]
patentee ... is entitled to all the profits it would have made . . . 'but for' the infringement"); see
also S. REP. No. 79-1503, at 1387 (1946) (stating that § 284 was intended to allow recovery of
"any damages the complainant can prove" (emphasis added)).
150. See Gen. Motors Corp., 461 U.S. at 654-55; Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1544-45; S.
Rep. No. 79-1503 at 1387.
151. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006) (emphasis added).
152. See id.
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method or measurement used to calculate post-notice damages. 53 The
decisions in Johnson Electric and its progeny, Power Integrations,
exhibit the fundamental flaw of failing to recognize the difference
between the infringing activities for which damages are recoverable
under the marking statute, on the one hand, and the evidence or
methods that may be used to calculate these damages, on the other.
Like the unsuccessful defendant in Vulcan Engineering, the District
Courts in Johnson Electric and Power Integrations erroneously
characterize the damage expert's consideration of pre-notice prices-in
connection with calculating price erosion damages on post-notice
infringing activity-as seeking to recover damages on infringing
activity that occurred before notice was given. 154 These are not the
same thing. The marking statute applies only to one of them (limiting
the infringing activity on which damages may be recovered), but not
the other (determining the evidence or methods used to calculate the
damages on these infringing activities).
There is no disputing the rule that damages are limited to
infringing activity occurring after notice has been received by the
accused infringer. However, it does not follow from the plain
language of the statute that the evidence relevant to the proper
calculation of these post-notice damages is itself limited to post-
notice conditions.
To the contrary, the Federal Circuit has recognized that the
development of the complete evidentiary record on price erosion
damages may require consideration of pricing and price levels that
pre-date not just notice, but also the entry of the infringing product
into the marketplace. 55 There also is no difference between using pre-
notice data to calculate price erosion and the Federal Circuit's well-
established rule that the determination of a reasonable royalty (on
sales made by the infringer during the accounting period) is based on
a hypothetical negotiation between the patent holder and the infringer
occurring when the infringing sales first began.' 56 The hypothetical
153. See id
154. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268, 280-
81 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., No. C.A.
04-1371-JJF, 2006 WL 2435084, at *1-2 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2006).
155. See Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d
1336, 1359 (Fed Cir. 2001) (finding damages expert used an improper benchmark, but noting
that pre-infringement pricing data can support a lost profits analysis) (citing Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
156. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating
specifically that the hypothetical negotiation occurs at the time infringement began); see also
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negotiation requires the parties to reconstruct, as of the time the
infringement first began, the royalty rate the patent holder and the
infringer would have agreed upon assuming they were willing
participants in the negotiation. 157 The courts have identified numerous
factors as relevant to reconstructing the parties' respective negotiation
positions, encompassing among other things the parties' experience in
licensing any related technology, the parties commercial relationship,
the profitability and commercial success of the technology, and the
utility and technical advances of the technology over what came
before. 58 Since the hypothetical negotiation is placed at the date
infringement begins, in many if not most instances, the evidence
relevant to determining the outcome of the negotiation will come
from documents and events that come well before any actual or
constructive notice under the marking statute. Notwithstanding that
the evidence falls outside the accounting period defined by the
marking statute, the Federal Circuit deems it admissible on the
question of the amount of reasonable royalty damages. 159 In Wang
Laboratories, Inc., 160 the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court's
ruling that the date of the hypothetical negotiation could not be earlier
than the date of actual notice, and explained:
It is true that limitations may apply to the period for which
damages may be recovered. As in the present case, failure to mark
patented goods is a limitation on recovery of damages in the
absence of notice. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1988). However, the court
confused limitations on damages due to lack of notice with
determination of the time when damages first began to accrue, and
it is the latter which is controlling in a hypothetical royalty
negotiation. 161
The Federal Circuit recognized, in Wang Laboratories that,
although the economic harm resulting from patent infringement may
Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting a
reasonable royalty should be determined at a time before the infringement began) (citing Hanson
v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura
Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (focusing on the date infringement began for
hypothetical negotiations, and noting that actual profits of the infringer after the date of a
hypothetical negotiation is admissible as evidence as to what royalty rate a reasonable
prospective licensee might have agreed to)).
157. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554.
158. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
159. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
160. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
161. Id. at 870.
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accrue before the accounting period, the consideration of this harm is
nonetheless admissible in calculating damages on infringing activity
that falls within the accounting period.
162
Likewise, as discussed above, economic harm from eroded
prices first begins to accrue with the entry of the infringing products
into the marketplace. Therefore, in many or most instances, such
harm will pre-date any actual or constructive notice that defines the
beginning of the accounting period. 163 As in Wang Laboratories, and
no different from the calculation of reasonable royalty damages, the
pre-notice evidence of this economic harm should be admissible for
purposes of determining the eroded prices suffered by the patent
holder on either its own sales-or the diverted sales made by the
infringer-that were made during the accounting period.
The countervailing cases have no answer for why the
admissibility of a pre-notice hypothetical negotiation of a reasonable
royalty does not also compel the admissibility of pre-notice price
erosion. Johnson Electric does not address the issue. 164 The court in
Power Integrations may have found persuasive the argument made by
the accused infringer in its written brief to the court that reasonable
royalty damages are based on a legal fiction and are designed to
provide a minimum recovery in the event that actual damages in the
form of lost profits are not available.1 65 However, the purported
distinction is not compelling. Both lost profits due to price erosion
and reasonable royalty are well-recognized elements of patent
infringement damages, and both elements-not just reasonable
royalty-require the reconstruction of a hypothetical market to show
what would have happened "but for" the infringing conduct. With
respect to reasonable royalty damages, the fiction is the royalty that
the parties would have agreed upon prior to any infringing conduct.
166
With respect to price erosion, the fiction is the price or prices that the
162. See id.
163. See supra, Section I.
164. See generally Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc. v. Mabuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp.
2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Memorandum Order Document Number 265 at 5, Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., C.A. No. 04-1371-JJF (D. Del. June 2,
2006) (distinguishing Wang Labs. as "focused on reasonable royalty which is not the issue
here"), aft'd, Memorandum Order Document Number 329 C.A. No. 04-137 1-JJF (D. Del. Aug.
22, 2006).
165. See Reply Brief in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment of
Limitation of Damages Under 35 U.S.C. § 287 (Failure to Mark) at 6-7, Power Integrations, Inc.
v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l., Inc., No. 04-1371-JJF (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2006).
166. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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patent holder would have been able to charge in the absence of the
infringing conduct. 1
67
Proponents of a rule that bars damage experts from relying upon
evidence of eroded prices may be concerned that to hold otherwise
reduces the patent holder's incentive to provide timely notice under
the marking statute. If the patent holder knew that it could delay
giving notice without forfeiting consideration of pre-notice price
erosion, the patent holder would indeed delay giving notice-or so
goes the argument. However, while it is true that the marking statute's
limitation on recoverable damages is intended to create economic
incentives for giving timely notice,1 68 these incentives remain strong
even if pre-notice evidence of reduced prices is used to calculate price
erosion damages. The patent holder still has a strong incentive to
provide timely notice because the longer it waits to give notice, the
fewer the number of infringing sales taken into account in calculating
patent infringement damages. In addition, if the patent holder delays
giving notice, the greater the likelihood that damages are limited or
even barred due to laches or estoppel. 169 By providing prompt notice,
the patent holder also increases the likelihood that the infringer will
be found to have acted in an objectively reckless fashion, thereby
increasing the likelihood of recovering enhanced damages. 170 In
addition, the patent holder knows that the sooner it contacts the
infringer, the sooner the parties can negotiate a license that will
generate revenue for the patent holder.
Furthermore, allowing consideration of pre-notice evidence of
eroded prices does not excuse the patent holder from having to meet
the usual, stringent burdens of proof applicable to patent infringement
damages.1 7 1 The patent holder must provide expert testimony on the
alleged price erosion that is qualified, reliable, and relevant within the
meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and specifically Rule
702.172 Price erosion damages cannot be based on mere speculation
167. See Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
168. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
169. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can
Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725 (D. Del. 2007).
170. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
171. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see
also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931); see also
N.D. Cal. Model Patent Jury Instr. B.5.1 (Nov. 29, 2007) ("While [patent holder] is not required
to prove its damages with mathematical precision, it must prove them with reasonable certainty.
[Patent holder] is not entitled to damages that are remote or speculative.").
172. FED. R. EVID. 702. This rule states:
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and conjecture. 173 Moreover, while the patent holder is not required to
know, at the time it lowered its prices, that the competitor was
offering an infringing product, it must still establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the amount of the price reduction, and
that the price was reduced as a result of the competing product.,7 4 In
short, there are ample checks built into existing evidentiary rules and
burdens of proof to protect against unduly high, speculative, or
otherwise unfounded awards of price erosion damages. If the patent
holder's damage expert relies upon pre-notice evidence of eroded
prices to calculate price erosion damages, and if this evidence
survives the evidentiary screens for speculative or unreliable
evidence, and if the fact finder ultimately awards price erosion
damages in a specific amount, there is a high level of confidence that
this award is necessary to provide full compensation to the patent
holder for harm suffered as result of the infringing conduct.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to -understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
To be admissible, expert testimony on price erosion damages must meet the requirements of
Rule 702. Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., No. 4:98cv325, 2001 WL 36131932, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 13, 2001). The trial judge must determine whether a designated witness is qualified to give
the expert opinion he seeks to express. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156
(1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). The burden is on the
party offering the expert testimony to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is
reliable. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The party
offering the challenged expert opinions need not, however, prove "that the expert's testimony is
correct." Moore, 151 F.3d at 276. The district court must also make a "'preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid [(the
reliability criterion)] and of whether the reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts at
issue [(the relevance analysis)]." Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d
606, 617 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). The district court's
responsibility is "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. The
court "must ensure the expert uses reliable methods to reach his opinions; and those opinions
must be relevant to the facts of the case." Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th
Cir. 2004).
173. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
174. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); see also Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(stating that for price erosion damages, the patentee must show that, but for the infringement, it
would have been able to charge and receive a higher price).
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VIII.CONCLUSION
There is sparse and conflicting law regarding whether or not to
include pre-notice data in proving post-notice price erosion damages.
Although the law is unclear, economic theory requires that as much
relevant data as possible be used to calculate the impact of a
competitor in the market. Arguments for excluding this data revolve
around providing an increased incentive for early notice. Arguments
for including this data revolve around providing "full" post-notice
economic recovery. While both arguments have legally compelling
aspects, this is not merely an "academic" issue or an area of minutia
for "damages attorneys." The difference between the two ways of
calculating changes the resulting total damage award by as much as
tens of millions of dollars. As such, in many cases, the un-solved
question of whether pre-notice data should be used in post-notice
price erosion calculation will have a significant impact on the total
damages awarded.
* * *
